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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case Nos.
14824
14825

GEORGE K. COMISH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from two convictions of
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance for value,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(1) (a) (1953, as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, Jr. sitting without a jury, and a verdict of
guilty was returned.

A judgment and sentence of conviction

was entered on that verdict.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming
the judgment of the Court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter was tried on stipulated facts.
Counsel stipulated that on September 16r 197 5, and on
October 25, 1975 appellant did distribute for value a
controlled substance, marijuana, to Terry Wright (R. 47).
An envelope
evidence.

containing the marijuana was admitted into
It was further stipulated that Terry Wright

was an officer of the University of Utah Police Department
who was working for and under the direction of Larry Hedburg,
his supervisor at the University of Utah Police Department
and a special deputy of the Salt Lake County Sheriff.
The distribution for value occurred at an address not
located on the University of Utah's property, but within
Salt Lake County.

Appellant moved the Court to dismiss

the information because they were based on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice, and the Court denied the
motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
OFFICER WRIGHT WAS NOT AN ACCOMPLICE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. §

77-31-18 (1953 AS AMENDED);

THEREFORE HIS TESTIMONY NEED NOT BE CORROBORATED TO SUSTAIN
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
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A.

Officer Wright was operating within his

jurisdiction as a peace officer»
Utah Code Ann* § 53-45-5 (1953, as amended)
provides in part that:
"Members of the police or
security department of any state
institution of higher education
shall . . . be peace officers and
shall also have all of the powers
possessed by policemen in cities and
by sheriffs, . . . providing, however,
that such powers may be exercised only
in cities and counties in which such
institutions, its branches or
properties are located and only in
connection with acts occurring on the
property of such institution or when
required for the protection of its
interests, property, students or
employees; and otherwise within such
counties when specifically requested
by the state or local law enforcement
officials having jurisdiction,"
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that Officer Wright was acting
outside of the authority granted to University police
officers by this statute when he attempted to obtain
evidence of unlawful sales of marijuana off of the University
campus.

In support of his contention, the appellant cites

State in the Interest of Hurley, 28 U.2d 248, 501 P.2d
111 (1972), where this Court held that the exception in the
above cited statute that allows University police to patrol
"when required for the protection of its interest?, property,
students, or employees" only authorized patrol under some
type of exigent circumstances where the direct and immediate
interests of the institution are involved.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Hurley case, however, did not deal with the
other circumstance where the statute allows a University
police officer to exercise authority off of the campus,
i.e. "when specifically requested by the state or local
law enforcement officials having jurisdiction."

In this

case, Officer Wright was at all times acting under the
direction of Special Deputy Htedburg, a local official
having jurisdiction to enforce the Utah Controlled
Substances Act throughout Salt Lake County.
Ann. § 58-37-9 (1953, as amended).

Utah Code

Consequently, Officer

Wrightfs actions were squarely within the language
of the statute, and did not exceed the authority granted
him by Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953, as amended).
Alternatively, Officer Wrightfs actions were not
in excess of his authority under the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 1975). Appellant has contented
that the statute does not apply to University police
officers because they are not "peace officers duly
authorized by any governmental entity of this state."
However, as Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953, as amended)
makes clear, University police officers are authorized
as peace officers by the State of Utah (although they are
appointed by the University).

Assuming that the University

did authorize its own police officers, those officers would
still be within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp.
197 5) because State institutions of higher education are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"political subdivisions" of the State•
§ 53-45-6 (1953, as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

Respondent respectfully

submits that Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 1975)
is in full force to define when a University police
officer may exercise a peace officerfs authority beyond
the limits of his normal jurisdiction.

Subsection 1(b)

of the statute states that an officer may exercise
authority out of his jurisdiction when an offense
is committed in the office's presence.

Appellant asks

this court to narrow the application of this section to
offenses which the officer observes by happenstance,
but has cited no authority and given no cogent reason
for such a restrictive^reading.

Respondent submits

that the language and intent of the statute is clear,
and that officers may exercise authority in connection
with any offense committed in their presence, whether
or not they have provided the opportunity for the offense
to be committed.
Subsection 1(d) of the statute again authorizes
an extrajurisdictional exercise of authority when the
officer is requested to assist local peace officers.
Appellant claims the subsection is inapplicable because
Deputy Hedburg is not a local law enforcement officer,
but a member of a University Police Department sworn
to act as a local law enforcement officer.
distinction without a difference.

This is a

Deputy Hedburg is a
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at the University of Utah Police Department does not
deprive him of his authority.
Finally, appellant argues that both of the
above exceptions are inapplicable because Officer Wright
failed to meet the notification requirements of
subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (Supp. 1975).
Assuming for the purposes of argument that notification
is absolutely required in order to authorize the officer's
actions, Office Wright did notify and report back to
Deputy Hedburg in connection with his investigation of
the appellant.

This establishes substantial compliance

with the requirement that "the local law enforcement
authority" be notified.
Because Officer Wright purchased the marijuana
pursuant to his duty as an officer, he is not criminally
liable as an accomplice.
(1953, as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-15(3)

There'is consequently no need to

corroborate his testimony in order to sustain appellant's
conviction.

State v. Serrell, 11 Or. App. 324, 501 P.2d

1324 affirmed 265 Ore. 216 508 P. 2d 1405 (1972)..
B.

Officer Wright was the agent of a duly

authorized officer, and only feigned participation in the
crime in order to procure evidence against the appellant.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant's argument that Officer Wright is
an accomplice is premised on the notion that anyone
who knowingly participates in a crime is an accomplice
regardless of their intent, unless they are a police
officer.

This ignores a fundamental premise of the

criminal law; that no person is guilty of a crime unless
he acts with criminal intent.

Officer Wright's intent

was not to participate in an unlawful sale of marijuana,
but to procure evidence of the unlawful sale.
Officer Wright's

Thus,

actions were justified and not

punishable under law.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401 (Supp.

1975) provides that an actor's conduct is justified
when the act "is reasonable and in fulfillment of
[the actor's] duties as a governmental officer or
employee. . . . "

or when the conduct is justified for any

other reason under the laws of the State.
The legislature has indicated that an intent
to procure evidence is not a criminal intent.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975) provides that:
"Entrapment occurs when a law
enforcement officer or a person
directed by or acting in cooperation
with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order
to obtain evidence of the
commission for prosecution. . . . "
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The statute demonstrates that an agent acting on behalf
of the police department is so closely associated with
law enforcement that his inducement of a crime is a
defense to the person induced.

The legislature did

not intend to provide a defense to a person induced
to commit a crime by an accomplice as criminally
liable as himself.

If Officer Wright had induced the

commission of the crime, the appellant could clearly
have claimed the defense of entrapment.

It would be

anomalous to state that Officer Wright was so closely
linked with the police that his inducement of a crime
renders it no crime at all, and that he is so closely
linked with the appellant that his criminal guilt is
identical to his, making him an accomplice whose testimony
must be viewed with deep suspicion.

The intent necessary

to make out the defense of entrapment, i.e. the intent
"to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution"
is clearly not a criminal intent.
It appears to be the unanimous opinion of Courts
that have considered the problem that an agent, operating
under the direction of a police officer in an attempt
to obtain evidence of a crime, is not an accomplice
of a criminal defendant, and no corroboration of his
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testimony is required to sustain a conviction.

State

v, Acosta, 101 Ariz. 127, 416 P.2d 560 (1966) and State
v. Runge, 233 N.W.2d 321 (S.D. 1975).

Also compare

State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972),
where this Court held that a police agent who was not
an officer was not the accomplice of a seller of narcotic
drugs.
Respondent submits that the fact that Officer
Wright purchased the marijuana in an effort to enforce
the law negates any criminal intent on his part, justifies
his conduct and demonstrates that he was not appellant's
accomplice.
C.

The buyer of a controlled substance is not

the accomplice of the seller.
In the Kasai case supra, this Court held that a
purchaser of a controlled substance is not an accomplice
of a person who distributes a controlled substance for
value in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a).
Appellant has attempted to avoid the ruling of this case
by pointing out that it was not decided under the present
statutory formulation that defines when a person is
criminally responsible for the conduct of another•

The

present formulation is found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202
(Supp. 1975).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Every person. . . who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes
an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct."
The Kasai case was decided under the terms of Utah Code
Ann. §76-1-44 (1953) (repealed).
"All persons concerned in the
commission of a crime. . • whether
they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and
abet its commission or, not being
present, have advised and encouraged
its commission* . . are principals
in any crime so committed."
Although the present law contains some terms
not found in the former statute (solicits, requests), it
is hard to determine why it expands the criminal liability
of a buyer over the former statute.

A willing buyer aids

and encourages the seller in making a sale, yet a buyer,:]
was held not an accomplice of the seller under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-44 (1953) (repealed).

There is no reason

to believe that the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202
(Supp. 1975) was meant to change that result.
In fact, the language of the present statute
appears to have been drawn from ALI, Model Penal Code, Tentative
Draft No. 1 (1953) § 2.04(3) (pg. 11).
"A person is an accomplice of
another person in commission of a
crime if with the purpose of promoting
or facilitating the commission of crime
he commanded, requested, encouraged,
or provoked such other person to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

commit or aided, agreed to aid,
or attempted to aid such other
person. . . . "
The drafters of this language commented:
"Should the man who has intercourse
with a prostitute be viewed as an
accomplice in the act of prostitution,
the purchaser an accomplice in the
unlawful sale, . . . ?
These are typical situations where
conflicting policies and strategies,
or both, are involved in determining
whether the normal principles of
accessorial accountability ought to
apply. One factor that has weighed
with some state courts is that
affirming liability makes applicable
the requirement that testimony be
corroborated; the consequence may be
to diminish rather than enhance the
law's effectiveness by making any
convictions unduly difficult. . .
To seek a systematic legislative
resolution of these issues seems a
hopeless effort; the problem must be
faced and weighed as it arises in each
situation. What is common to these
cases is, however, that the question
is before the legislature when it defines
the individual offense involved. . . •
• It is proposed, therefore, that in
such cases the general section on
complicity be made inapplicable, leaving
to the definition of the crime itself
the selective judgment that must be
made. If legislators know that buyers
will not be viewed as accomplices in
sales unless the statute indicates that
this behavior is included in the prohibition, they will focus on the problem
as they frame the definition of the crime."
ALI, Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No.
/.-•-• (1953) (per.. 35,36).
In sum, the originators of the language used in
the present statute recognized the limits of a general
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definition of an accomplice.

In certain circumstances,

specifically including unlawful sales, the drafters
recommended that the specific ptatute that defines the
crime control the liability of the parties involved.
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953 as amended)
clearly differentiates the criminal liability of a
buyer and seller of a controlled substance.

Subsection

(1) of the act makes it unlawful to produce, dispense or
distribute for value a controlled substance and prescribes the punishments for persons who commit those
acts.

Subsection (2) states that it is unlawful to

possess or use a controlled substance and provides a
different schedule of penalties for those prohibited
acts.

Nearly every person who possesses a controlled

substance comes into possession by purchase or gift,
but if all of these possessors were punishable as
accomplices under subsection (1), subsection (2) would ,
be surplusage.

The legislative intent is to punish those

who buy differently from those who sell.

Consequently,

a buyer's testimony need not be corroborated to sustain
a conviction for the unlawful sale of a controled substance.
This result is consistent with this Court's
prior holdings on separate criminal offenses that are
inextricably connected.

In addition to the Kasai case,

supra, see State v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(1952) holding that a person who resorts to a house
of ill fame is not the accomplice of one who keeps
a house of ill fame, even though both offenses were
defined in the same statute and not separated into
subdivisions.

See also State v. McGee, 26 U.2d 373,

489 P.2d 1188 (1971), holding that a person who commits
perjury is not the accomplice of a person who suborns
the perjury, and State v. Cragun, 8 5 Utah 149, 38
P.2d 1071 (1934) holding that the woman upon whom an
abortion is performed is not the accomplice of the
person inducing the miscarriage.

The rule that the

buyer of a narcotic is not the accomplice of the seller
prevails in other jurisdictions.

State v. Christensen,

474 P.2d 282 (Or. App. 1970); Lujan v. State, 85 Nev.
16, 449 P.2d 244 (1969).
Respondent submits that the buyer of a controlled
substance is not an accomplice of the seller.
D.

Assuming Officer Wright is criminally

responsible for appellant's acts, he is still not an
"accomplice" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18
(1953).
In State v. McDonald, 26 U.2d 336, 489 P.2d
434 (1971), this Court stated that:

-13-
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"[I]t is interesting to note
that statutorily our State has not
defined an 'accomplice1/ the matter
having been left to the decisions
of the courts, text writers, etc."
26 U.2d at 337 n.l.
Appellant's brief proceeds on the premise that if a
person is criminally responsible for the conduct of
another, he is an accomplice.

Assuming that an in-

former-buyer is criminally liable for a seller's conduct under a broad reading of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202
(Supp, 197 5) f a buyer-informer would still not meet the
test announced by this Court in State v. Georgopoulos,
27 U.2d 53, 492 P.2d 1353 (1972).
"In order for one to be an
accomplice it must be shown that
he knowingly, voluntarily, and
with common intent with the principal
offender, united in the commission
of a crime. . . . "
27 U.2d at 55.
In deciding whether to reverse a conviction because it
is based on the testimony of an "accomplice", this Court
should look to the rationale of the statute rather than
apply a mechanical test.

As one commentator has said:

"The Court should interpret the
term 'accomplice' in light of the
objectives of the corroboration
statute, and not require that the
witness fall exactly within the
criminal code definition of the term
for the purpose of a possible prosecution of the witness for the same
crime as the defendant." 1972 Utah
LR 60, 68.
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The purpose of the statute is to protect a criminal
defendant from being convicted upon evidence that is
inherently unreliable.

Balanced against this interest

of the defendant is society's right to be free from
needless restrictions on the prosecution and punishment of criminals.

In the Kasai case, supra, this

Court decided that a buyer's testimony is not so
suspect that it cannot convict a seller of drugs.
Respondent submits that this is a sound precedent, particularly under the facts of this case.

Counsel has

stipulated that appellant committed the crime with
which he was charged, and there is consequently no
possibility that the appellant is being unjustly
accused.

As this Court stated in State v. McGee, 26 U.2d

373, 489 P.2d 1188:
"The rule (of corroboration)
is intended to prevent scurrilous
prosecution, but the rule has no
application where the accused admits
on the stand, on the trial for the
offense that he has committed the
offense. . . His admission obviates
any need for protection from malicious
prosecution," (Emphasis in original)
26 U.2d at 375 quoting from State v.•
Johnson, 141 Mont. 1, 374 P.2d
504 (1962). ,
Respondent submits that appellant's conviction
is based on reliable evidence, and in the interest of
justice, the conviction should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above* points and authorities,
respondent submits that Officer Wright's testimony
was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction, and
urges this Court to affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
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